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AN INTERNATIONAL DNA DATABASE: 
BALANCING HOPE, PRIVACY, AND 
SCIENTIFIC ERROR 
ALLISON PURI* 
Abstract: The discovery of DNA technology is considered one of the 
most revolutionary and beneficial contributions to the modern 
industrialized world. Not only has it led to formidable advances in 
medicine and genetic biology, but, in the past ten years, DNA 
technology also has become an important tool to law enforcement 
personnel and the legal community. Since 1986, police officers and 
lawyers have used DNA to find, apprehend, convict, and exonerate 
criminals ranging from burglars to murderers. The creation of the first 
DNA criminal investigative database in 1995 in Britain further enabled 
law enforcement to better exploit the uses of DNA technology and 
effect more acts of justice. As many more countries develop similar 
databases and seek to create one international databank, however, 
legislatures must ensure that the advancement of this tremendously 
powerful tool will not overshadow the fundamental right of privacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately twenty-eight years ago a baby girl was welcomed 
into this world with a future full of possibilities.1 Twenty-two years 
later, onJuly 11, 1994, this same girl lay nude and slain in her Peters-
burg apartment.2 Hope Denise Hall's life never could have been la-
* Allison Puri is the Senior Managing Editor of the Boston CollRge International and 
Comparative Law Re/Jiew. She dedicates this Note in loving memory of her grandmother, 
Mary G. MacLeod (1914-2001), whose kindness and intelligence will continue to inspire 
for years to come. 
I See, e.g., Esmeralda Barnes, Slaying Moves Mother to Action, FAIRFAX J. (Mar. 27, 1997), 
http:/ /hope-dna.com/articles/hajairfaxjournal_970327_al.hun; Jon Pope, 7V Station 
Employee Found Dead, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (July 12, 1994), http://hope-dna.com/ 
articies/haJichtimesdisp_940712.htm; Nick Pronko, City Records Sixth Murder, PETERSBURG 
PROGRESS INDEX (July 12, 1994), http://hope-dna.com/artides/ha_progressindex940712. 
htm. 
2 E.g., Jon Pope, "Brilliant" Future Dashed, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (July 12, 1994), 
http://hope-dna.com/articles/ha_ richtimesdisp_940712_a.htm; Memorial Service Is Set For 
Slain VSU Student (July 16, 1994), at http://hope-dna.com/articies/haJichtimesdisp_ 
940716.hun; Hope Denise Hal~ JUC ArticlR, at http://hope-dna.com/articles/hajuc_art 
.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2000) [hereinafter JUC ArticlR1. 
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beled easy or privileged.3 At only eighteen months old, Hope gave her 
family its first glimpse of the strength she possessed when she man-
aged to fight off a serious bout of pneumonia that threatened to take 
her life.4 Hope's next obstacle and opportunity to display her inner 
steel came years later at the age of nine.5 At an age when a girl's only 
worry should be what to wear to her best friend's birthday party, Hope 
had to grapple with the possibility of death yet again.6 She was diag-
nosed with kidney cancer and given only eleven months to live if she 
did not seek treatment.7 The young Hope, true to her name, survived 
surgery and chemotherapy with patience and prayers, crying only 
once when the treatment claimed her thick, beautiful hair.8 
Hope persevered and went on to build a promising future as her 
cancer went into remission.9 She graduated from a Fairfax County 
high school in 1989 as a National Merit Scholar and went on to 
George Mason University with a scholarship to study journalism,lo It 
finally looked as though the girl who had encountered such tragic 
hurdles so early in life was finally making a name for herself.l1 
Unfortunately, the good times didn't last long.12 In her sopho-
more year, Hope became pregnant.13 Despite her dubious health, she 
decided to take a year off from school and give birth to her son.14 M-
ter giving birth, Hope moved to Petersburg to be closer to her son's 
father and to go back to school. I5 The steadfast single mother re-
sumed her studies at Virginia State University while working part-time 
as an associate producer at Channel 12 in Petersburg.16 Hope once 
3 See, e.g., Lorraine Blackwell, Jury Recommends Death in Murder Trial, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH (July 24, 1998), http://hope-dna.com/articles/haJichtimesdisp_980724_art2. 
hun; Barnes, supra note 1. 
4 Barnes, supra note 1. 
5 Blackwell, supra note 3; Barnes, supra note I. 
6 See Blackwell, supra note 3; Barnes, supra note 1. 
7 Blackwell, supra note 3; Barnes, supra note 1. 
S Barnes, supra note 1. 
9 See Barnes, supra note 1; Michael Grossman, DNA "Cold Hit" Gives Police a New Suspect 
in 1994 Munier, PETERSBURG PROGRESS INDEX (Jan. 9, 1997), http://hope-dna.com/arti-
des/ha_progressindex_960827.hun. 
10 Barnes, supra note I;Jl1C Article, supra note 2. 
II See Barnes, supra note 1 ;JUC Article, supra note 2. 
12 See Barnes, supra note 1. 
13Id. 
14 Id. 
15Id. 
16 E.g., Barnes, supra note I; Maribeth Brewster, Losing HlfjJe, STYLE WEEKLY (July 19, 
1994), http://hope.dna.com/articles/ha_styleweekly_940719.htm; Pope, supra note 2. 
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again proved that steely determination and hard work payoff as she 
graduated rnagna curn laude with a degree in mass communications)7 
It was her dedication, dependability, and perfectionism that led 
her co-workers to become worried when Hope did not report to work 
on time on day during in the summer of 1994.18 Mter making a series 
of unsuccessful phone calls to her apartment, a few reporters from 
the news station traveled to Hope's apartment only to be confronted 
with horrific news.19 Maintenance workers for the apartment complex 
had found Hope lying lifeless in her apartment bedroom.20 She had 
been raped, stabbed across her body a total of fifteen times, and her 
throat had been slit three times with a steak knife. 21 It became clear 
that finally Hope had been confronted with an obstacle that all her 
strength could not get her through.22 
As her family struggled with the tragic death, the police were hav-
ing their own difficulties handling the murder.23 Grieving neighbors 
were not able to supply much information.24 Some said that they 
thought they had heard someone running down the stairs in the early 
morning hours but had thought nothing of it in such a busy apart-
ment complex.25 A few others thought they had seen a male acquain-
tance of Hope's leave her apartment the day she was murdered.26 Moo 
ter arresting him, however, the police released him because his DNA 
did not match the samples found at the crime scene.27 For two years, 
family, friends, and the police became more and more discouraged as 
17 See Barnes, supra note 1; Brewster, supra note 16; Pope, supra note 2. 
18 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 1; Pope, supra note 1; Pronko, suina note 1. 
19 See Barnes, supra note 1; Pope, supra note 1; Pronko, supra note 1. 
20 Barnes, supra note 1; Pope, supra note 1; Pronko, sujHa note 1. 
21 E.g., Lorraine Blackwell, Women Tell of Earlier Attacks, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH 
(July 23, 1998), http://hope-dna.com/artic1es/haJichtimesdisp_980723.htm; Ellen Soro-
kin, Slaying Testimony Hits Rapist, FAIRFAX]. (July 23,1998); Michael Grossman, Death Pen-
ally Is Sought in Hall Murder, PETERSBURG PROGRESS INDEX (Mar. 21, 1997), http://hope-
dna.com/ artic1es/ha_ progressindex_970321.htm. 
22 See Blackwell, supm note 21; Sorokin, supra note 21; Grossman, sujJra note 21. 
23 See. e.g., Ellen Sorokin, Trial Begins in Hall Murder Case, FAIRFAX]. (July 22,1998), 
http:/ /hope-dna.com/artic1es/ haJairfaxjournal_980722_1.htm [hel'einafter Trial]; Ellen 
Sorokin, DNA + Database Tells Tale, FAIRFAX]. (Mar. 27, 1997), http:/ /hope-dna.com/ art-
ic1es/haJairfaxjournal_970327_1.htm [hereinafter DNA Database]; Grossman, supm note 
9. 
24Id. 
25 Pronko, supra note 1. 
26 Ellen Sorokin, '94 Killing In Jury's Hands, FAIRFAX J. (July 24, 1998), http:/ /hope-
dna.com/ artic1es/haJairfaxjournal_980724.htm. 
27Id. 
---- .. _-------------------------
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they began to lose hope that they would ever discover who took 
Hope's life on the lonely day in July. 28 
Finally in August 1996, a scientific miracle occurred that was re-
sponsible for finding Hope's murderer.29 The Virginia DNA databank, 
developed by Virginia lawmakers in 1989, got a "cold hit. "30 The data-
bank, which was the first of its kind in the United States, is made up of 
blood samples that are collected from convicted felons and various 
unsolved crime scenes from across the state.31 The databank routinely 
compares the samples of the felons with the crime scene information 
looking for potential matches.32 A "cold hit" occurs when the database 
makes a match between a felon and a particular crime scene when the 
felon was never a suspect in the case.33 A "cold hit" means that, with-
out the match, the suspect likely never would have been found. 34 
In Hope's case, a nineteen-year-old man, who was serving a one 
hundred year prison sentence for abduction and multiple rapes, was 
matched to Hope's murder via his DNA samples.35 Mter an emotional 
trial and sentencing hearing, Shermaine Ali Johnson was convicted of 
the murder of Hope Denise Hall and was sentenced to death.36 
Since Hope's case, almost all states in the United States have de-
veloped similar DNA databanks that have led to several other convic-
tions for previously unsolved crimes.37 In addition, the FBI recently 
developed a national DNA databank that links the information in all 
the participating state databanks.38 Hope Hall's parents have set up a 
memorial project with a mission to create an international DNA data-
bank.39 Although such a databank has not been implemented yet, it is 
not all that far off on the horizon.4o Several other countries have or 
28 See, e.g., Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
29 See Tlial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
30 Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
31 Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
32 Tlial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
33 E.g., Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
34 See Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, supra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
35 Trial, supra note 23; DNA Database, Sllpra note 23; Grossman, supra note 9. 
36 Lorraine Blackwell, Jury Sentences Man to Death For Rape, Murder, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH (July 25, 1998), http://hope-dna.com/articles/haJichtimesdisp_980725.htm. 
37 E.g., VICTOR WEEDN & JOHN llicKs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE UNREALIZED Po-
TENTIAL OF DNA TESTING (1998); Tony & Carol Sievers, LetlerFrom Tony & Carol Siellers, at 
http://www.hope-dna.com/letter.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2000); Joseph Heeger, [UFO: 
Feds "'tint Your DNA http://www.beyond-the-illusion.com/lists/iufo/1998/Nov/013:~.html 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2000). 
38 E.g., WEEDN, supra note 37; Sievers, supra note 37; Heeger, supra note 37. 
39 Sievers, supra note 37. 
40 See WEEDN, supra note 37. 
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are beginning to develop similar databanks, and former Attorney 
General Janet Reno showed great interest in the future of DNA as an 
investigative too1.41 Although an international databank undoubtedly 
would bring the potential for more acts of justice similar to Hope's 
case, many are concerned with privacy, constitutionality, and other 
issues that such a system raises.42 This Note analyzes the possibility for 
an international DNA databank. 
First this Note provides a basic background on what DNA is and 
its revolutionary growth over the past twenty years. Next, this Note 
compares the uses of DNA databanks across the world by highlighting 
the growth in the United States and the constitutional issues raised, 
the British experience and the recent worries over incorrect matches, 
and the privacy issues currently being raised in the Far East. Finally, 
this Note analyzes how well the databanks from these countries could 
work together and the potential problems that such a compilation 
could cause. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DNA and Sampling Procedures 
DNA is the commonly known abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic 
acid,43 the genetic material found in the nucleus of all cells in living 
organisms.44 It is often referred to as the "blueprint of life" because it 
contains the information needed to give us our physical characteris-
tics and functional abilities.45 
Each strand of DNA contains a chain of chemical subunits for the 
coding and expression of genes.46 These subunits direct the cells to 
41 E.g., WEEDN, supra note 37; NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Nq 177626, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
HANDLING REQUESTS iii (1999); Heeger, supm note 37. 
42 See, e.g., Michael Higgins, DNA Databases HeljJ Nail Slippl'1)' Criminal, But Their Potential 
Uses Make Privacy Advocates Nervous lVhen it Comes to Arrestees and Ordina1~V Citizens, 85-0CT 
A.B.A. J. 64 (1999); Gary Tuchman, New Yorh to Expand DNA Testing of Convicts, CNN.COM 
(Oct. 20, 1999), at wysi\\yg:/ /21/http://www.cnn.com/US/9910/20/dna.database/in-
<lex.htm; Dan L. Bnrk & Jennifer A. Hess, Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Considerations in 
ForensicDNA Testing, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. LJ. 1,15-16 (1994). 
43 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE O~- DNA EVIDENCE, supm note 41, at 21. 
44Id. 
45 Id.; Burk & Hess, supm note 42, at 3-4. 
46 E.g., Angus J. Dodson, Comment, DNA "Line-Ups" Based on a Reasonable Suspicion 
Standard, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 221, 227 (2000); Robert W. Schumacher II, Article, Expand-
ing Nl'1v }orhs DNA Database: The Future of Law EnforCl'1nent, 26 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1635, 
1638-39 (1999); Burk & Hess, supra note 42, at 3-4. 
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construct proteins that provide structure and chemical reactions 
within the cells.47 The proteins, therefore, determine the characteris-
tics of the cells and the cells determine the characteristics of the per-
son.48 Likewise, faulty DNA sequences have been known to cause ge-
netic defects, abnormalities, and diseases.49 
The double helix or twisted ladder shaped strand is made up of 
four organic bases called adenine, cytosine, thymine, and guanine.5o 
Pairs of these bases make up the rungs of the ladder.51 Adenine can 
only be matched up with thymine, and cytosine can only be paired 
with guanine.52 Each DNA molecule consists of over three billion base 
pairs arranged in particular sequences.53 
Forensic scientists are able to "read" the DNA sequences and find 
differences among species.54 They reduce the base names down to 
letters, namely "a," "c," "t," and "g."55 Then scientists read the se-
quence of these letters by looking at one-half of the ladder.56 Al-
though the majority, 99.9%, of the letter sequence on a human DNA 
strand is identical, there are portions on each strand that differ from 
individual to individuaJ.57 Thus, in a DNA strand with three billion 
letters, one tenth of one percent difference translates into three mil-
lion separate spelling differences.58 These are the differences that sci-
entists examine in the process known as DNA fingerprinting to de-
termine identity and heritage.59 
47 Burk & Hess, supra note 42, at 4. 
48Id. 
49 E.g., David F. Betsch, DNA. Fingerprinting in Human Health and Society, at http://esg-
www.mit.edll:8001/esgbio/rdna/fingerprint.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2000); Michelle 
Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 767, 818-19 (1999); Burk & Hess, supra note 42, at 4. 
50 E.g., Dodson, supra note 46, at 227; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1638-39; Bllrk & 
Hess, supra note 42, at 3-4. 
51 See Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1638-39. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54 Eric S. Lander, DNA on the Witness Stand, at http://www.accessexcellence.org/AB/ 
WYW /index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2000). 
55 E.g., Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640; Lander, supra note 54. 
56 E.g., Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640; Lander, supra note 54. 
57 E.g., Lander, supra note 54; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1639; Dodson, supra note 
46, at 227. It is important to note, however, that identical twins have identical DNA and do 
not differ at any point along the molecule. Dodson, supra note 46, at 227. 
58 Lander, supra note 54. 
59 See, e.g., Lander, supra note 54; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1639; William C. 
Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA 
TVa/; "84]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22,26--27 (1993). 
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Unfortunately, for purposes of forensic DNA fingerprinting, sci-
entists do not read all three billion letters.6o Instead, to save time and 
money, scientists look at a very small handful of sites of variation.61 
Along the DNA strand, or genome, there are regions where the base 
pair sequences repeat themselves.62 For instance, one person could 
have the sequence of "t-a-c-t-g" repeat three times and another person 
could have that same sequence repeat twice or appear only once.63 
Thus, these normally biologically insignificant sequence repetitions 
create spelling differences in particular areas.64 In general, forensic 
scientists cut the DNA strands with an enzyme at these points of repe-
tition.65 They then record the repetition variations by reducing the 
data into a bar code type expression.66 When comparing DNA samples 
from crime scene evidence to a suspect's DNA sample, scientists will 
compare the "bar code" information from each site of variation.67 If 
the bar code differs between the evidence and the suspect's DNA at 
any point, that particular suspect is usually ruled out as a possible 
source of the DNA evidence.68 However, if the bar codes are the same 
along all points of variation tested, the suspect is considered more 
likely to have left the evidence.69 It is important to note, however, that 
this does not mean the suspect committed the crime or even left the 
DNA evidence.7o Because scientists do not read the entire DNA, look-
ing for any and all variations, two samples conceivably could appear as 
60 See Lander, supra note 54. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Lander, supra note 54; Sclmmacher, slljJra note 46, at 1639; Charles M. 
Strom, Geneticfllstice: A Lamyer's Guide to the Science o{DNA Testing, 87 ILL. BJ. 18,20 (1999). 
66 See Lander, supra note 54. 
67 See id. Samples can come from a number of sources and, as the technology develops, 
even more plausible sources may develop. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ""HAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD 
KNow ABOUT DNA (1999). Currently, samples can be taken from u'aditional bodily fluids 
such as blood, saliva, or semen. See id. However, they also can be taken from hair, bones, 
clothing, organ tissue, and even skin cells that have rubbed off onto inanimate objects 
such as glass, fabrics, or even dirt. See id. 
68 Lander, supra note 54. ""hen the samples do not match, however, it does not mean 
that the suspect did not commit the crime. Id. For instance, the DNA sample taken from 
the crime scene could be from an innocent person or a co-conspirator. Id. 
69Id. 
70Id. 
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exact matches but actually differ in some other portion of the 
strand. 71 
Thus, two main concerns always must remain at the forefront of 
the scientific and legal community's conscience when conducting 
such sample comparisons.72 First, laboratories must remain unadul-
terated and impeccable because careless mistakes and sloppiness eas-
ily can create paramount errors.73 Second, scientists need to make 
clear to the legal community exactly what these tests do and do not 
prove.74 For example, before using samples to determine the likeli-
hood of guilt, the proper weight must be applied to apparent 
matches. 75 Some sequences are more rare than others and, therefore, 
some matches are more common than others.76 Usually the frequency 
of different DNA sequences varies across the population.77 Thus, 
some results of DNA comparisons or DNA fingerprinting can be in-
conclusive while others can be conclusive with no evidentiary value 
and still others can be conclusive and relevant to innocence or guilt.78 
71 Id. 
72 See id. 
73 See Lander, supra note 54. 
74 See id. There has been a great deal of controversy among the scientific and legal 
communities surrounding these issues. See id. Currently there are no mandatory standards 
for forensic testing. Id. In fact, there are higher standards for the laboratory practices of 
someone who will diagnose strep throat. Id. In addition, people are worried that the statis-
tical significance applied to DNA evidence is either over or underestimated. See id. There-
fore, the National Research Council Committee from the National Academy of Sciences 
has taken important steps in defining standards for laboratory and statistical calculations. 
Id. One significant contribution has been the creation of a mandatory proficiency tcst for 
laboratories conducting DNA sampling and analyses. Id. 
75 See id. 
76Id. 
77 Id. In addition to statistical probabilities, other concerns must be addressed when 
determining the appropriate weight to be given to matches. See NKr'L COMM'N ON THE 
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 21-29. For instance, identical twins are known 
to have exact DNA matches and therefore, must always be considered in identity issues. Id. 
at 21. In addition, scientists indicate that some samples from one individual could show 
multiple DNA sources due to recent blood u'ansfusions. Id. at 22. Finally, the need for 
control samples is imponant, especially in sexual assault cases, to ensure that no one is 
improperly included or excluded as a suspect. Id. at 22. 
78 Richal'd Zitrin, DNA Expert Retained far Decades-Old Munier Case, APB NEWS (Oct. 15, 
1999), http://www.apbnews.com/newscenter/breaki ... ws/1999/IO/15/0IdcaseI015_0l. 
html?s=en. A result can be inconclusive for a number of reasons, such as an inadequate 
sample or the lack of a control sample. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, 
supra note 41, at 29. A sample is considered conclusive if it matches along all tested points 
of variation and is compared to a control sample. Id. at 28. A sample can be considered 
irrelevant if it comes from a source that could be present legally, such as a consensual sex-
ual partner. Id. at 29. 
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Technology has developed three main types of DNA testing that 
are widely used for both science and legal identification purposes.79 
Each testing protocol differs slightly and each has its own pros and 
cons.80 Therefore, circumstances, such as the age, size, and handling 
of the sample, determine what type of testing is used.81 
1. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Testing 
The first type of testing that has been widely used by forensic sci-
entists for legal identification purposes is known as Restriction Frag-
ment Length Polymorphism Testing (RFLP).82 This procedure was 
developed by Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys and was first reported in 
1985.83 RFLP testing is generally accepted by the courts in the United 
States and has resulted in a number of post-conviction exonerations.84 
The RFLP testing process generally follows the guidelines dis-
cussed above but it does not actually "read" the sequence repeti-
tions.85 Instead, it isolates certain areas of repetition and essentially 
measures the length of these sections.86 The lengths are then re-
corded as bar codes and compared between samples as discussed 
above.87 
RFLP testing is best used on large, unadulterated or untarnished 
samples.88 Many samples collected from crime scenes, therefore, are 
too small for such testing.89 In addition, samples that are too old can 
79 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 26-28; 
Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640-46; Thompson, supra note 59, at 26-30. 
80 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 26-28; 
Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640-46; Thompson, supra note 59, at 26-30 .. 
81 See Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640-46. 
82 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 26-27. RFLP 
testing also has been used frequently in the area of familial testing, such as paternity tests. 
See id. 
83Id. at 26. 
84 Id. There are approximately 300 appellate rulings regarding RFLP testing in tlle 
United States. Id. 
85 See id. at 27; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640-41. 
86 See Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1640-41. It follows that a sample fragment that 
repeats a sequence three times will be longer than a fragment that only repeats twice. See 
id. 
87 See id. For a more in depth analysis, see NAT'L COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27. 
88 NAT'L COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 26. A 
"large" sample would contain at least 100,000 cells, e.g., a dime-sized or larger saturated 
bloodstain. Id. 
89 See id. 
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start to decompose and become less pristine.9o Thus, older or smaller 
samples are better suited to other types of testing.91 When RFLP test-
ing is plausible, however, it is very discriminate.92 Thus, samples ap-
propriately subjected to RFLP testing can result in statistically strong 
exclusions and inclusions even when only testing a few DNA regions.93 
2. Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing-Nuclear DNA 
Because of the sample limitations of RFLP testing, another type 
of testing, known as Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing (PCR), has 
become the most widely used technique in the field of molecular bi-
01ogy.94 PCR was first developed by Dr. Kary Mullis at Cetus Corpora-
tion in 1984.95 It was first used in the area of criminal identification in 
1986.96 Like RFLP testing, PCR is also accepted by the courts and has 
resulted in a number of post-conviction exonerations.97 
Unlike RFLP testing, however, PCR testing can be done on 
smaller and less pristine samples.98 Small samples can be subjected to 
PCR testing because sample amplification is part of the process.99 Es-
sentially specific regions of DNA are copied using an enzyme called 
Taq polymerase and then are compared in a type of bar code for-
mat. lOO Like RFLP testing, an exclusion is generally considered dis-
positive, however an inclusion is less discriminate.101 Therefore, in 
90 [d.; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1642. 
91 See Schumachel', supra note 46, at 1642. 
92 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27; Schu-
macher, supra note 46, at 1641-42. 
93 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27. This 
statement assumes that the testing was conducted correctly and that other considerations 
previously mentioned were taken into account. See id. at 21-24. 
94 [d. at 27. 
95 [d. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. 
98 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27; Schu-
macher, supra note 46, at 1642. A "smaller" sample only needs to contain fifty to one hun-
dred cells, e.g., a visible dot of blood or a single hair root. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE 
OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27. A less pristine sample is one that may have de-
graded because of improper storage or old age. [d. 
99 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27; Schu-
macher, S'llpra note 46, at 1642-43. 
100 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27. 
101 [d. at 27-28; Schumachel', supra note 46, at 1643. 
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order to have a more statistically strong inclusion, PCR testing needs 
to be conducted at a number of sites along the DNA strand.102 
3. Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing-Mitochondrial DNA 
Finally, a third type of testing has emerged that can be used on 
extremely old or damaged samples.103 Traditional RFLP and PCR test-
ing is done on DNA found in the nucleus of the cell.104 However, PCR 
testing can also be done on DNA found in the mitochondria of a cell 
(MtDNA).lo5 Because the DNA does not come from the nucleus, this 
testing can be done on samples from dried bones, teeth, hair shafts, 
or any other sample that contains very little or highly degraded nu-
clear DNA.loo 
PCR testing on MtDNA is not as widely used as traditional nu-
clear DNA testing and only a limited number of laboratories are able 
to conduct such tests.107 MtDNA testing has, however, been used in a 
number of court cases in the United States. lOS Usually MtDNA testing 
is used to link a sample to a particular family since mitochondria is 
passed from a mother to her offspring.l09 
B. DNA Revolution 
Given the tremendous power and versatility of DNA technology, 
DNA has become not only an important discovery to the scientific 
and genetic biology world, but it also has provided great advances in 
the legal community. no Law enforcement officers and lawyers quickly 
realized that DNA could become a useful complement to or even re-
placement for traditional fingerprint evidence.lll It even has been 
suggested that over the past ten years DNA technology has been one 
102 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 27; Schu-
macher, supra note 46, at 1643. 
103 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 28; Schu-
macher, supra note 46, at 1643-44. 
104 Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1643. 
105 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 28. The mito-
chondria is a cell organelle involved in pmducing cellular energy. [d. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 [d. 
109 See id. 
110 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 1; 
WEEDN & HICKS, supra note 37; Betty Anne Bowser, Strands of Justice, ONLINE NEWSHOUR 
(July 10, 1998), athttp://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec98/dna_7-1O.html. 
III See Higgins, supra note 42, at 64-65; WEEDN & HICKS, supra note 37. 
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of the most revolutionary changes in law enforcement.ll2 The first 
known use of DNA testing in the area of criminal identification was in 
1986.113 In this landmark case, Colin Pitchfork's DNA was matched 
using RFLP testing to the DNA of semen collected from two rape-
homicides in Narbourough, England.lI4 
Moreover, public law enforcement agencies and criminal lawyers 
are not the only ones who have become involved in the investigative 
use of DNA technology.ll5 Within five years of the notion of DNA 
spelling differences being used for medical purposes, private compa-
nies entered the business and began to provide DNA typing services 
to law enforcement officials. lI6 Shortly thereafter, in 1989, the FBI had 
its own DNA typing lab in the Hoover Building in Washington. ll7 In 
1995, Britain developed the first known DNA criminal investigative 
database that allowed for a completely new type of criminal investiga-
tion. lIB Instead of simply using DNA sample evidence on a case-by-case 
basis, DNA databanks allow investigators to use the information on a 
grand scale and use the samples for multiple ongoing investiga-
tions.lI9 Now countries all over the world, including the United States, 
have begun to model similar databases after the British example.120 
With the obvious possibilities that such a technology creates for 
criminal investigation and law enforcement, the courts have been 
forced to address the admissibility of DNA data as legal evidence.l21 
The courts generally have applied two different tests to determine 
whether scientific evidence, such as DNA, should be admitted in a 
given case.122 The original test for the admissibility of DNA and other 
112 Higgins, supra note 42, at 67. 
113 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 1. 
114 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 1. Before the 
DNA identification, a seventeen-year-old mentally handicapped kitchen porter had been 
incarcerated for several months after confessing to one of the murders. Id. 
115 See Lander, supra note 54. 
116Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Mike Blail", Peds Want Your DNA, at http://www.beyond-the-illusion.com/lists/iufo/ 
1998/Nov /0133.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2000). 
119 See, e.g., Hibbert, supra note 49, at 767; WEEDN & HICKS, supra note 37; Burk & 
Hess, supra note 42, at 10-11. 
120 See, e.g., Richard Willing, lHismatch Calls DNA Tests Into Question, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 
2000), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/ncmon09.htm; Roderick Campbell, 
Matching of DNA Could Help Clean Up Crimes, CANBERRA TIMEs,June 11, 1999, at 4, available 
at 1999 WL 15638053; Ng Kang-Chung, Legislatures Fear DNA Test Plans Open to Abuse, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at 6, available at 1999 WL 2520961. 
121 See Thompson, supra note 59, at 30-33. 
122 See id. 
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scientific evidence was developed in Frye v. United States123 and is 
commonly known as the Frye standard.124 The Frye standard asks a 
court to determine whether the scientific evidence in question has 
"gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs."125 
Mter the development of the Frye standard, most federal and 
state courts attempted to apply it to scientific evidentiary questions.126 
When applying the Frye standard, however, courts did not inquire into 
the reliability of the particular piece of evidence in question. Instead, 
they had to determine the general reliability of the scientific test as a 
whole.127 Because this type of analysis is so vague, many became con-
cerned with the reliability of such a standard.128 One major concern 
that was particularly relevant to the area of DNA testing was that the 
Frye standard tended to unfairly discredit relatively new tests and prin-
ciples.l29 Given the fast rate of change that often occurs in scientific 
communities, such as the constant changes among types of available 
DNA testing, the Frye standard could create an unfortunate roadblock 
to admissibility.l3o For instance, the development of PCR DNA testing 
easily could have been considered not "generally accepted in the sci-
entific community" when many were still using RFLP testing. l3l 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, there are still relatively few labs that are 
able to conduct MtDNA PCR testing and, therefore, under the Frye 
standard such testing may not be admissible because it is too new.132 
Thus, many thought that the birth of a new test for scientific evi-
dentiary admissibility was greatly needed.133 In 1993, the Supreme 
Court developed such a test in the landmark case, Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals.134 The Supreme Court concluded that the Frye 
123 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cit·. 1923). 
124 Thompson, supra note 59, at 30-3l. 
125 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
126 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NC"J 161258, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTAB-
LISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xii (1996). 
127Id. 
128 See id. at xxii. 
129 See id. at xii. 
130 See id.; Thompson, supra note 59, at 3l. 
131 See supra text accompanying notes 82-102. 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 103-109; Thompson, supra note 59, at 31. 
133 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). 
134Id. 
354 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24:341 
standard had been superseded by the enactment of the FED. R. EVID. 
702.135 FED. R. EVID. 702 simply states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.136 
Therefore, the court in Daubert concluded that in order for scientific 
evidence to be admissible it must (1) be shown to be scientifically 
valid and (2) must be relevant to at least one issue in the case.137 In 
order to make these determinations the courts can look at (1) 
whether the principle or technique has been or can be reliably tested, 
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review or publication, (3) its 
known or potential rate of error, (4) whether there are standards or 
organizations controlling the procedures of the technique, (5) 
whether it is generally accepted by the community, and (6) whether 
the technique was created or conducted independently of the litiga-
tion.l38 Therefore, the Daubert test still allows for the consideration of 
the Frye standard, however, the "generally accepted" prong has be-
come only one factor rather than the only factor in the analysis.139 
This change has somewhat increased the admissibility of DNA proce-
dures because now newer tests still will be given consideration.140 The 
Daubert case, however, was decided on statutory rather than constitu-
tional grounds. Consequently, each state court remains free to fashion 
its own standard for admitting scientific evidence, including contin-
ued use of the Frye standard.141 According to a Department of Justice 
report, as of 1995, twenty-two states remained essentially committed to 
the Frye standard. 142 Whether under the Frye or Daubert standard, as of 
1998, forty-six states admit DNA evidence in criminal proceedings.143 
135 Id. at 588-89. 
136 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
137 Daubert, 509 u.s. at 592. 
138 Id. at 593-94. 
139 See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126, at xii. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that 
judges still have the power to limit scientific evidence admissibility under FED. R. EVID. 
403. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. He further stressed that caution is important because such 
evidence can have a very powerful and mystitying effect over jurors. Id. 
140 See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126, at xii. 
141 See id. 
142Id. 
143 Id. at 6. 
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In forty-three states the courts have ruled on the admissibility of the 
technology while the remaining three states require compliance with 
statutes for admission. l44 
Recently it has become clear that DNA is not only useful to police 
officers and lawyers in strengthening cases against suspects.145 In fact, 
DNA has become extremely helpful to suspects and their defense at-
torneys in proving innocence.l46 The FBI has stated that nearly one-
third of people are exonerated as suspects immediately upon DNA 
testing.l47 They further state that before DNA testing, they never 
could have excluded the same people using other test results such as 
standard blood markers. I48 In addition, DNA testing has provided a 
unique, non-investigative opportunity for convicts that no other type 
of evidence has been able to provide to the same extent. I49 Many con-
victs are now filing for post-conviction relief based on previously un-
available DNA testing.l5o In 1996, the National Institute of Justice un-
der the guidance of former Attorney General Janet Reno issued a 
report on this subject entitled Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: 
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial. I51 
The report opened with an introduction written by Reno stressing the 
importance of the use of DNA evidence to exonerate the innocent.152 
The report then provided twenty-eight case studies where the use of 
previously unavailable DNA technology proved the innocence of con-
victed felons. I53 The twenty-eight men in the study had served an av-
erage of seven years in prison before exoneration.154 One case in-
volved a man, Kirk Bloodsworth, who had been convicted twice of 
14<1Id. The four states that have not admitted DNA evidence are Maine, Nonh Dakota, 
Rhode Island, and Utah. id. at ex. l. The three states that have statutes requiring admis-
sion are Nevada, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Id. 
145 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, at 2. 
146 See id. 
147 Lander, supra note 54. 
148 Id. Blood marker tests, such as the Lattes test, allow scientists to identity certain 
substances, such as ABO blood group substances, from a biological stain. See CONNORS ET 
AL., supra note 126, at xv. Although these tests are capable of narrowing down the possible 
SOUTce of the evidence, they often fail to yield usable results because they are less discrimi-
nating and more susceptible to detel·ioration. See id. 
149 See, e.g., Geraldine Sealey, The DNA Revolution, at http:/ / abcnews.go.com/sections/ 
us/DailyNews/ dnatesting990803.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2000); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE 
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41, passim; CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126. 
150 See Sealey, supra note 149; CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126. 
151 CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126. 
152 See id. at iii. 
153Id. at 34-76. 
154 Id. at iii. 
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beating, sexually assaulting, and strangling a nine-year-old girI.l55 Wit-
nesses, who said they saw Bloodsworth with the girl earlier in the day, 
identified him as the likely murderer.156 In addition, Bloodsworth's 
statement about a bloody rock157 and a comment about doing some-
thing "terrible" on the day of the murder158 were entered as evidence 
against him.I59 Mter his second conviction, his lawyer requested DNA 
testing that was previously unavailable.I6o Mter three separate tests 
were done,161 it was concluded that Bloodsworth was not the mur-
derer.162 Mter serving approximately nine years on his second sen-
tence, two of which were on death row, the prosecutor joined the de-
fense in petitioning for a pardon that was granted by a Baltimore 
County Circuit judge on June 28, 1993.163 Finally, in December 1993, 
Maryland's governor officially pardoned Bloodsworth.I64 
Three years after the initial report, the National Commission on 
the Future Use of DNA Evidence issued another report entitled Post-
conviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests.165 The 
report is aimed at highlighting the legal and scientific issues involved 
in post-conviction testing.I66 It further provides recommendations for 
prosecutors, defense counsel, the judiciary, victim assistance groups, 
and laboratory and law enforcement personneI.l67 The report states 
155 Id. at 35. The Maryland Court of Appeals overturned Bloodsworth's first conviction 
because the police had withheld evidence regarding a possible other suspect from his de-
fense attorneys. Id. at 36. 
156 CONNORS ET AL., supra note 126, at 36. 
157 During a police interrogation, Bloodsworth mentioned a "bloody rock." [d. This 
statement was considered significant because the murderer had beaten the girl's head with 
a rock. [d. It was later revealed, however, that there was a bloody rock placed on the table 
next to Bloodsworth during the interrogation. [d. 
158 The prosecution provided evidence that Bloodsworth had told acquaintances that 
he had done something "terrible" on the day of the mUl"der that would affect his malTiage. 
[d. It was later revealed, however, that he was refelTing to the fact that he had forgotten to 
buy his wife a promised taco salad. [d. 
159 [d. 
160 [d. 
161 CONNORS ET AI.., supra note 126, at 36. The first test conducted by the Forensic Sci-
ence Associates revealed Bloodsworth's DNA did not match any of the evidence received 
for testing. [d. at 37. A second test was requested, however, due to the possibility of im-
proper sample labeling. Id. The second test affirmed the findings of the first. [d. Finally, 
the FBI conducted a third test, which confirmed the findings of the first two. [d. 
162 [d. 
163 [d. Because courts in Maryland only allow new evidence to be presented within one 
year of the final appeal, Bloodsworth could not have been granted a new trial. Id. 
164 Id. 
165 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 41. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
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that since the 1996 report, more than forty additional convicts have 
benefited from post-conviction testing. 1GB Similar post-conviction re-
lief cases also have occurred in other countries all over the world.169 
Courts in Canada, Hong Kong, and New Zealand all have reversed 
convictions based on subsequent DNA testing results,l70 Moreover, 
many of the countries that have allowed such post-conviction testing, 
especially Canada and the United States, have expressed concern over 
the problems that these cases have unveiled. l7l With DNA testing 
highlighting more and more mistaken convictions, many are ques-
tioning the traditional forms of law enforcement identification such 
as eyewitness testimony.172 Therefore, these post-conviction cases high-
light yet another important reason for the use of DNA, and more spe-
cifically DNA databases, as an investigative tool.173 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. DNA Databanking and the Constitution of the United States 
In 1989, Virginia became the first state to implement a criminal 
DNA database.174 Originally, the database called for the inclusion of 
samples from certain classes of violent crime and sex offenders.175 
Shortly afterward, however, the legislature expanded the database to 
include all newly convicted felons and was applied retroactively to 
current felons who were required to submit samples upon release.176 
Mter passing constitutional muster in 1992, according to the Fourth 
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals in Jones v. Murray,177 the 
legislature further expanded the database in 1996.178 The new data-
168 Id. at iii. 
169 See, e.g., R v. Sauve [1999] 41 W.C.B.2d 1; R v. Dougherty [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 257; R v. 
Vee David, [1995] 3 H.K.C. 525. 
170 See id. 
171 See Jack King, The Ordeal of Guy Paul Morin: Canada Copes With Systemic Injustice, THE 
CHAMPION (Aug. 1998), http://209.70.38.3/Champion/ArticIes/98augOl.htm; CONNORS 
ET AL., supra note 126, at iii. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 Hibbert, supra note 49, at 774. 
175Id. 
176Id. 
177 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
178 Hibbert, supra note 49, at 774. 
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base demanded the inclusion of certain juvenile offenders over the 
age offourteen.I79 
The other forty-nine states quickly followed suit. ISO Less than a 
decade after Virginia's first implementation, all fifty states had en-
acted some form of a criminal DNA database. lSI Every state currently 
collects samples from certain convicted sex offenders, however, be-
yond that point the states differ greatly.IS2 Some states require collec-
tion of samples from all felons both violent and non-violent. ls3 Fur-
thermore, other states require collection from some classes of 
misdemeanors.ls4 In addition, a few states have or still require collec-
tion of blood from arrested suspects before conviction.IS5 In addition, 
certain states have a type of "two strikes and you're out" type of legis-
lation in which a person who was previously convicted of certain 
crimes will have to submit to testing upon the conviction of any other 
later crime.IS6 Moreover, an increasing number of states have seem-
ingly gone against the general ideal of juvenile reform and required 
inclusion of juvenile offenders as well.IS7 
Not only do states differ in the types of offenders included in the 
databases, but they also differ in the allowed uses of the databases 
themselves. ISS Most states allow the databases to be used for criminal 
investigations of any kind. ls9 Some states, however, restrict the types of 
criminal investigations allowed.I9o In addition, other states allow for 
the use of the data upon court order; therefore, these samples could 
be used in civil cases such as paternity suitS. I91 
In addition to the individual state DNA databases, the FBI has 
created a national DNA database.192 In 1994, the DNA Identification 
179Id. at 774-75. Juveniles offenders are required to submit samples if they committed 
crimes that would constitute felonies if they had been tried as adults. See id. 
180 See id. at 775. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 775-78. 
183 See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-6 (Michie 
Supp.1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1995 & Supp.1999). 
184 See, e.g, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (A) (West Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-12-1109 (Michie Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713 (1997). 
185 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 609 (West 1999). 
186 See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.148(a)(2)(Vernon 1998). 
187 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
102g (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999). 
188 See Hibbert, supra note 49, at 779-81. 
189 See id. at 779. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. at 788. 
192 Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1646. 
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Act authorized the FBI to establish the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS).193 Essentially, CODIS consists of three tiers of DNA data. 194 
The first level is called the Local DNA Index System (LDIS) and con-
sists of information installed by the laboratories of local police and 
sheriff departments.195 The next level is the State DNA Index System 
(SDIS) and allows the individual local laboratories to exchange in-
formation throughout the state.196 Finally, the third level is the Na-
tional DNA Index System (NDIS) that allows states to share informa-
tion between each other on a national scale,197 
With the development of CODIS and the expansion of state DNA 
databases, many critics, especially civil libertarians, have become con-
cerned with privacy and abuse issues associated with such databases. 198 
The primary legislative purpose given to support DNA databases is 
related to recidivism rates.199 Database supporters state that statistics 
show that many offenders of particular types of crimes, e.g. sex of-
fenses, have a high incidence of repeat offenses.2oo Therefore, sup-
porters state that a DNA database will help law enforcement identify 
suspects of new crimes who were previously convicted of earlier 
crimes.201 In addition, proponents hope that DNA databases will pro-
vide a deterrent effect to counteract recidivistic tendencies. 202 They 
reason that a released convict will be less likely to commit additional 
crimes if he knows that his DNA is on file with the government.203 
Critics claim, however, that this is a violation of our society's commit-
ment to reform, especially with respect to juvenile offenders, and the 
presumption of innocence.204 Furthermore, opponents fear that with 
1931d. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. at 1646 n.88. 
196 Id. 
197 Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1646 n.88. 
198 See, e.g., Sealey, supra note 149; Tuchman, sulna note 42; Beverly Lumpkin, DNA 
Commission Issues RepOTts, ABC NEWS (Sept. 27, 1999), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/ 
sections/ us/DailyN ews/ dnatesting990927 .htm. 
199 See Mark Hambletl, Sex OffendeT DNA Sampling Upheld, NY LJ. (Feb. 22, 2000), 
http://www.nylj.com/stories/99/09/092199al.htln. 
200 Steve Niezgoda, Comments at the Meeting of the National Commission on the Fu-
ture of DNA Evidence, in Proceedings, at http://\\'\\w.ojp.usdoj.gov /nij/ dnamtgtrans/trans-
e.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2000). 
201/d. 
202 Hamblett, supra note 199. 
203 See id. 
204 Hibbert, supra note 49, at 778; Benjamin Keehn, Strands of Justice: Do DNA Databanks 
Inji7'nge on Defendants' Rights?, ONLINE NEWS HOUR (July 17, 1998), at http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/july98/dna_databanks02.htm!. 
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a centralized system, DNA data easily could get into the wrong 
hands.205 In addition, legislatures and law enforcement agencies are 
working to set laboratory standards and confronting tremendous 
backlogs of data created by database expansion.206 
1. Possible Constitutional Violations 
Currently, the major concern that most database critics have is 
that DNA database sampling statutes allow for the mass screening of 
individuals without individualized suspicion or probable cause.207 The 
general justification given to support such sampling is the notion that 
a certain class of people, i.e. certain convicted felons, are more likely 
to pose a danger to society than others.20B Thus, critics claim that such 
a justification undermines both the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.209 Thus, a few courts have 
been forced to address these issues and to determine whether DNA 
databases pass constitutional muster.210 
One of the most recent and controversial cases that addressed 
this precise issue is Landry v. Attarney Gencral.211 In Landry, plaintiffs 
challenged the validity of a Massachusetts DNA database statute,212 
which requires involuntary collection of blood samples from all per-
sons convicted of thirty-three different types of offenses.213 The given 
legislative purpose of the statute is to "assist local, state and federal 
criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in: (1) deterring and 
discovering crimes and recidivistic criminal activity; (2) identifying 
individuals for, and excluding individuals from, criminal investigation 
205 See Mark Hansen, Banking on DNA, at http:/ / www.abcnet.org/journal/aug99/ 
08NDNA.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2000); Higgins, supra note 42, at 64-64. 
206 See, e.g., Tuchman, supra note 42; Christopher Asplen, The Future of DNA Evidence, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 4, 1999), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DaiIyNews/ 
dnaexpert080499_chat.htm; Dr. Philip Reilly, Comments at the Meeting of the National 
Commission on the Future of DNA E,idence (July 26, 1999), in Proceedings, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dnamtgtrans6/trans-h.html(last visited Feb. 22,2000). 
207 Hamblett, supra note 199; Keehn, supra note 204. 
208 See Niezgoda, supra note 200. 
209 See, e.g., Hamblen, supra note 199; Higgins, supra note 42, at 86; Burk & Hess, supra 
note 42, at 18-21. 
210 See, e.g., Hamblett, supra note 199; Higgins, supra note 42, at 86; Burk & Hess, supra 
note 42, at 18-21. 
211 Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N .E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999). 
212 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 22E, §§ 1-15 (1997). 
213 Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1085. An attempt or conspiracy to commit an enumerated 
crime also falls under the challenged statute. See id. at 1087. 
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or prosecution; and (3) search[ing] for missing persons."214 The stat-
ute states and regulates the use of the database for primarily criminal 
investigative purposes.215 The statute, however, also allows for the use 
of the database for other court proceedings and "advancing other 
humanitarian purposes."216 The plaintiffs argued that the statute al-
lowed for an unconstitutional search and seizure under both the fed-
eral and state constitutions.217 The Massachusetts Superior Court 
agreed and issued a preliminary iI~ullction against the statute.218 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, disagreed with the 
lower court's reasoning and reversed the decision.219 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the taking of a DNA 
sample constitutes a search and seizure, but decided that it is not un-
reasonable.220 The court explained that a prisoner's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his identity is diminished,221 and that there is a 
strong governmental interest in a "particularly reliable form of identi-
fication."222 Finally, the court weighed the strong state interest and the 
reduced expectation of privacy with the level of intrusiveness of the 
test. 223 Citing other cases that dealt with blood tests in different con-
texts, the court stated that a blood test is only minimally intrusive.224 
Thus, the court concluded that the search and seizure passes both 
federal and state constitutional requirements. 225 
In September of 1999, the Second Circuit of the United States 
Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in Roe v. Marcotte.226 The 
plaintiffs argued that a Connecticut statute,227 which requires all COll-
victed sexual offenders to submit a blood sample for a DNA database, 
violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of 
214 Id. 
215 See id. at 1088. 
216Id. 
217Id. at 1089. 
218 Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1089. 
219 Id. at 1090. 
22°Id. 
221 Id. at 1091. 
222 Id. The coun cites to high I"ates of recidivism among cel"tain 1)1)es of felons to sup-
port the government interest. Id. at 1091 n.l0. Later in the opinion, however, the court 
puzzlingly states that its opinion does not rely on recidivism issues. See id. at 1092. 
223 Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1091. 
224Id. 
225 Id. at 1094. The state constitutional analysis was essentially the same as the federal 
analysis. See id. 
226 Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F. 3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999). 
227 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102g (1994). 
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equal protection.228 The court in !We stated that the blood test is a 
Fourth Amendment search.229 Furthermore, the court indicated that: 
except in well-defined circumstances, a search is not reason-
able unless it is carried out pursuant to a judicial warrant is-
sued on probable cause. In general, searches performed in 
the absence of a warrant and pursuant to an exception must 
nevertheless be predicated upon "probable cause to believe 
that the person to be searched has violated the law," or, at 
the very least, "some quantum of individualized suspi-
cion."23o 
The court, however, did not end its inquiry there.231 Instead, the 
court referred to the "special need" exception as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989).232 In Skinner, the Supreme Court stated that in some circum-
stances a showing of individualized suspicion or probable cause would 
not be a constitutional floor.233 The Supreme Court indicated that a 
search may be reasonable despite the absence of individual suspicion 
in situations where the privacy interests are minimal and an important 
governmental interest would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement 
of such suspicion.234 Most of the cases since Skinner, however, have 
considered non-law enforcement situations ensuring institutional se-
curity or public safety.235 DNA database testing, therefore, does not 
fall into one of these traditional "special need" contexts.236 
The Second Circuit nonetheless found that an application of the 
special need exception to DNA sampling would not be an unreason-
able extension.237 Instead, they analogized to the "special needs" rec-
ognized in Griffen v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).238 In that case, the 
228 Roe, 193 F.3d at 75-76. 
229 [d. at 77. 
230 [d. 
231 See id. 
232 [d. at 77-78. 
233 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
234 [d. 
235 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (finding search of hospital 
employees' desks and offices falls within "special needs" exception); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 346-47 (1985) (holding search of student property reasonable under "spe-
cial needs" exception); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding body cavity 
inspections of prison inmates). 
236 Roe, 193 F.3d at 78-79. 
237 [d. at 79. 
238 [d. 
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Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's 
horne was reasonable under the "special needs" exception.239 The 
court relied on research that showed that intensive supervision of 
probationers reduced recidivism. 24O Thus, the Supreme Court held 
that the search was a type of regulatory function that was reasonable 
as applied to probationers but not the public at large.241 
Applying this reasoning to DNA sampling, the Second Circuit 
likewise relied on statistics showing that certain classes of offenders 
have higher recidivism rates.242 Therefore, the court concluded that 
there was a strong state interest in solving both past and future 
crimes.243 The court then balanced this interest against the minimal 
intrusion of a blood test244 and the "lack of discretionary decisions" 
involved in choosing whom to sample,245 and found the sampling con-
stitutiona1.246 Unlike the Massachusetts court in Landry, however, the 
Second Circuit stressed that it was not basing its holding on the di-
minished expectation of privacy reasoning.247 
Regardless of whether courts rely on the "diminished expectation 
of privacy" reasoning or the "special need" exception, all courts that 
have considered DNA database statutes have relied to some degree on 
recidivism rates.248 Thus, as DNA databases become more expansive, 
i.e. including all convicted offenders,249 non-convicted arrestees,250 or 
everyone at birth,251 critics have and will become more dubious of the 
239 Griffen, 483 U.S. at 870-74. 
240 [d. at 875. . 
241 [d. 
242/We, 193 F.3d at 79. 
243 [d. 
244 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (confirming that blood tests do not constitute an unduly 
extensive imposition on an individual's privaL)'). 
245 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) (test-
ing of all employees who applied for certain positions was reasonable because no official 
discretion was involved). 
246 /We, 193 F.3d at 80. Applying the "rational basis" test, the court held that the statute 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the FOlll"teenth Amendment. See id. at 82. 
The court held that the even if the statute was under-inclusive, it could not be invalidated 
on that basis alone. See id. 
247 [d. at 81-82. 
248 See, e.g., /We, 193 F.3d at 79; Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992); Lan-
dry, 709 N.E.2d at 1091 n.lO. 
249 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-6 (Michie 1997); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-403 (Michie 1999). 
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recidivism argument.252 Opponents argue that the government inter-
est will decrease and, therefore, the potential for a Fourth Amend-
ment violation will increase.253 
2. Potential for Abuse 
In addition to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional 
challenges, DNA databanks create another cause for concern.254 As 
mentioned before, each state's DNA legislation differs in many re-
spects.255 One inconsistency among the states is the existence and type 
of abuse protections.256 People fear that without proper safeguards in 
place, unauthorized people will be able to access the data stored in 
the databases. 257 Critics say that this could have far more dangerous 
effects than a corruption of a fingerprint database because of the type 
of information stored.258 Beyond its identification uses, DNA also can 
provide volumes of information about a person and his family, includ-
ing the ability to predict susceptibility to diseases.259 Without proper 
protections, the data potentially could be used as another type of ge-
netic discrimination.260 Critics foresee that insurance companies 
could use the data to raise premiums or reject extending coverage.261 
Others fear that some could be declined job offers or experience em-
ployment discrimination based on the data.262 
Unfortunately, many states do not have adequate protections in 
place against such abuse. 263 Among the states that do explicitly pro-
hibit such uses, some lack specifically defined punishments.264 Other 
states simply provide for the authorized uses of the data but even 
those are not specifically defined. 265 Vague phrases such as "law en-
forcement purposes" conceivably can be interpreted very broadly or 
252 See Higgins, supra note 42, at 65-66. 
253 See id. at 66-67. 
254 See Bowser, supra note 110. 
255 See Hibbert, supra note 49, at 779. 
256 See id. 
257 Bowser, supra note 110. 
258 See Benjamin Keehn, Strands of Justice: Do DNA Databanks Infringe on Defendants' 
Rights?, ONLINE NEWS HOUR (July 17,1998), at http://www.pbs.org/newsholir/fonull/ 
jllly98/ dna_databanksOl.html. 
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262 [d. 
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264 See id. 
265 See id. at 779-81. 
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very narrowly.266 For instance, the phrase could be interpreted to 
mean that the data can only be used for identification purposes.267 
Some, however, could interpret the same phrase to allow for looking 
for specific genetic traits such as diabetes to help provide non-
identification clues in a criminal investigation.268 Some opponents 
even fear that the phrase could be interpreted extremely broadly to 
allow for a type of eugenics.269 They suggest that eventually scientists 
may find a "violence gene" that could be used by law enforcement to 
weed out people prone to criminal activity.270 Therefore, legislatures 
and organizations, such as the National Commission on the Future 
Use of DNA Evidence, are constantly working to reword legislation in 
order to prevent any possible misuse.271 
3. Backlog and Laboratory Concerns 
One of the biggest concerns facing state and federal law en-
forcement agencies with the expansion of DNA databanks is the issue 
ofbacklog.272 Currently there are approximately 1.5 million convicted 
felons who qualify to be included in the databanks but have not been 
sampled.273 Furthermore, not every state that has a database statute is 
collecting samples from all eligible classes of people.274 Some states 
have backlogs of samples that have not been appropriately analyzed 
yet.275 Federal and state agencies are blaming this backlog on a lack of 
funds and support.276 Thus, in the face of DNA database expansion, 
lawmakers must be conscious of the financial practicality of actually 
implementing the changes.277 
Another related implementation problem concerns the type of 
testing used on the samples.278 Many states are realizing that their da-
tabases are both internally and externally incompatible and therefore 
266 See id. at 781-82. 
267 See id. 
266 Hibbert, supra note 49, at 782. 
269 Bowsel', supra note 110; Schumacher, supra note 46, at 1654-55. 
270 Bowser, supra note 110. 
271 See Reilly, supra note 206. 
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274 Niezgoda, supra note 200. 
275Id. 
276Id. 
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ineffectual. 279 Samples from crime scenes may be too small to un-
dergo RFLP testing and therefore must be subjected to PCR testing.280 
The offender samples may be larger and therefore need to be tested 
using the RFLP technique.281 Thus, the crime scene samples will not 
be compatible with offender samples for purposes of looking for a 
match.282 The same problem occurs on a national level when one state 
uses PCR while another state uses RFLP testing.283 In response to this 
problem, the FBI is trying to expand the use of a standardized tech-
nology that would eliminate incompatibility issues.284 
In addition to the testing procedures used by laboratories, others 
are concerned with the presence or lack of standardized laboratory 
requirements.285 Under the DNA Identification Act, laboratories must 
meet certain specified standards to satisfy federal requirements for 
inclusion in CODIS.286 Some state statutes, however, lack similar re-
quirements and essentially leave it up to the laboratory personnel to 
ensure testing quality.287 Thus, on the state level, many critics worry 
that without such standards in place the potential for mistakes and 
ultimately false matches could rise to dangerous levels.288 
B. The Britain Experience: A One in Thirty-Seven Million Chance of 
Mistake? 
In 1993, a royal commission on the criminal justice system in the 
United Kingdom set up a rudimentary DNA database using RFLP ana-
lyzed samples.289 The database included approximately three to four 
thousand samples and only tested the samples at a single locus on the 
DNA strand.290 Under the legislation at the time, however, the samples 
allowed for inclusion were severely limited.291 Only samples from con-
victs who had been convicted due to DNA could be included in the 
279 Niezgoda, supra note 200. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 See id. 
283 See id. 
284 Niezgoda, supra note 200. 
285 See Lander, supra note 54. 
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287 See Hibben, supra note 49, at 797. 
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289 Lynn Fereday, Comments at the Meeting of the National Commission on the Fu-
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dnamtgtrans6/trans-i.htm(last visited Feb. 22, 2000). 
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database.292 Even with these limitations, however, law enforcement 
officials were able to achieve a number of successful hits from the da-
tabase.293 
Mter considerable lobbying the legislature passed the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act in 1994, which allowed for the sampling 
and storing of DNA from any individual who had been convicted, cau-
tioned, or suspected of committing a recordable offense.294 Then in 
1995, Britain officially opened the first true criminal DNA database.295 
As the world's largest database of its kind, the English database has 
experienced exponential growth.296 Over the past year the amount of 
included samples increased from 470,000 to 660,000.297 
Like its United States counterpart, the database includes samples 
from crime scenes and convicts.29B It also contains, in contrast, sam-
ples from suspects in unsolved crimes.299 In addition, the English da-
tabase differs from most American databases in that it includes far 
more classes of offenders.3OO Instead of simply including samples from 
sex offenders and other felonies, it also includes samples from of-
fenders of "petty" crimes such as burglaries and car thefts.301 
Moreover, unlike most database statutes in the United States, the 
British system authorizes law enforcement to take samples from peo-
ple arrested of crimes before conviction.302 Under this system, while a 
person is awaiting conviction or acquittal, his sample is stored and 
searched in the database just like any other sample from a convicted 
felon. 303 If the person is acquitted, however, the sample is ex-
punged.304 If a match is found in the interim, it can be used by law 
enforcement even if the person is later acquitted of the crime for 
which he was originally arrested.305 
292Id. 
293Id. 
294 See Fereday, supra note 289. 
295 Blair, supra note 118. 
296 See Willing, supra note 120. 
297Id. 
298 See FBI National DNA Database Is Up and Running, CONSPIRACY NEWSLINE (Oct. 15, 
1998), at http://www.parascope.com/articles/cnews/981015.htm [hereinafter FBI Na-
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In addition, British law enforcement agencies utilize a technique 
popularly known as DNA "dragnetting. "306 During a particular investi-
gation, police round up a group of people, usually by geographic re-
gion, and ask for voluntary samples.307 Although the samples are sup-
posed to be voluntary, many have suggested that the police use highly 
persuasive techniques to coerce people into giving samples.308 The 
police then put the samples into a separate database to compare to 
samples from a specific crime scene.309 Once the crime is solved the 
voluntary samples are destroyed, and they are always kept separate 
from the main database.3lo 
Overall, British officials estimate that the main DNA database 
eventually will include one third of all English men between the ages 
of sixteen and thirty.3l1 Furthermore, some law enforcement person-
nel have expressed the desire to have the entire citizenship tested and 
recorded.312 With so many samples included, the database averages 
between four hundred and seven hundred matches a week, as op-
posed to the approximate six hundred total matches attributable to 
the United States databases.313 In addition, the United Kingdom has 
registered the database to be shared with other countries throughout 
Europe and beyond.314 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming size of the British database has 
its drawbacks.315 In late January 2000, British database officials faced a 
major setback.316 During a meeting with the United States National 
Commission of the Future of DNA Evidence, British authorities an-
nounced that Great Britain's national DNA database had resulted in a 
mistaken identification.317 In 1999, Manchester police lifted the DNA 
from evidence left at the scene of a burglary.318 The sample was ana-
lyzed at six loci, or points of identification, and entered into the DNA 
306 Id. 
307 See Fereday, supra note 289. 
308 See id. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
3ll FBI National DNA Database, supra note 298. 
312 Blair, supra note 118. 
313 See Asplen, supra note 206; Deborah Smith, Cops and Swabbers, SYDNEY MORNING 
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database.319 The computer then matched it to one of the 660,000 
samples on file. 320 British authorities estimated that the likelihood of 
the match occurring at random was one in thirty-seven million.321 The 
matched suspect, however, provided an alibi and the police decided 
to conduct another DNA test.322 The second time, a new technique 
was used that could compare the samples at ten loci rather than six.323 
The suspect's DNA did not match at all of the additional loci and he 
was released.324 
Although the recent mismatch is officially considered the first 
mistake produced by a national database, law enforcement communi-
ties all over the world have reason to be concerned.325 An investigator 
from the British government appeals board is concerned that every-
one in the United Kingdom who was previously convicted with six loci 
testing will demand review for possible similar mistakes.326 British 
authorities claim that the mismatch was probably caused by the rap-
idly increasing size of the database.327 One database spokesman was 
even reported to have said that such a mistake was "to be expected. "328 
The reasoning is that as more samples are added, the higher the 
chance that the samples will be similar along more loci.329 Thus, other 
countries, such as the United States, who test more loci or have 
smaller databases, claim not to be immediately concerned.330 When 
looking to the future, however, some FBI officials are worried that 
similar mismatches could occur as the databases become more expan-
sive.331 
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C. Birth oJDNADatabanks in the Far East 
Within the past decade, many other countries, especially those in 
the Far East, also are experiencing the DNA Revolution.332 Like offi-
cials in the United Kingdom and the United States, legislatures in 
Australia, China, and New Zealand have realized the immense law en-
forcement potential of DNA and have begun to examine the possibil-
ity of investigative DNA databanks.333 Likewise, they also have experi-
enced similar resistance from civil libertarian groups and the public at 
large.334 Because these databanks are only in their infancy or develop-
ing stages, the most pressing question facing legislatures is deciding 
whose samples to include in the databanks.335 In addition, opponents 
are also raising the familiar privacy and access concerns.336 
1. Australia 
In late 1999, Australia's federal government decided to fund a 
national forensic DNA database as part of a fifty million dollar na-
tional criminal investigation system.337 Currently, only a few of the ter-
ritories have legislation that allows for the police to build up a DNA 
databank.338 The push for the national database, however, has caused 
the other territories to begin to review and model similar legisla-
tion.339 
The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General published the Model Forensic Pro-
cedures Bill in May 1999 to act as a guide for the territories to develop 
or enhance their DNA legislation.340 The territory of Victoria closely 
follows the model by authorizing police to seek court orders to secure 
DNA samples from convicted murderers and rapists. 341 The legislation 
332 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 313: Audrey Parwani, Voluntary Donations of DNA 'A Dan-
gel;' S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 19, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 19486409; Tim 
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in the Northern Territory, however, is more closely modeled after the 
British legislation.342 Because the police do not classiry the sample as 
intimate, they are able to secure samples without obtaining consent or 
a court order.343 In addition, the Northern Territory legislation is 
more like the British model in that it allows for sampling from a 
broader class of convicts, including those guilty of some driving of-
fenses. 344 
Other states in Australia, however, are having more difficulty de-
veloping DNA databank legislation.345 In New South Wales (NSW) , 
police and privacy officials are locked in a heated debate over pro-
posed databank legislation.346 In mid-April 2000, the police in the 
small town of Wee Waa conducted one of Australia's first mass DNA 
screens.347 After the brutal rape and beating of a ninety-three year old 
woman, police requested all of the six hundred adult males of the 
town to submit voluntary DNA samples for identification.348 Despite 
the voluntary nature of the procedure, many opponents suggested 
that declining to provide a sample would be seen as highly suspect.349 
Furthermore, critics believed that police did not really expect to find 
the rapist through the DNA sampling.35o Instead, they opined that the 
mass screen was actually a political tactic to get support for the highly 
controversial NSW DNA databank legislation.351 
Under the proposed legislation that is before the State Cabinet, 
police would be authorized to begin to build a DNA databank in 
2001.352 The databank would consist of saliva samples taken from 
342 See id. 
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NSW prisoners convicted of crimes that carry a minimum sentence of 
five years imprisonment.353 Moreover, some proponents of the data-
base, such as the National Party MP for Barwon, have urged that the 
legislation be further expanded to included people convicted of petty 
offenses.354 On the other side of the controversy, civil liberties groups, 
such as Justice Action, fear that mass DNA screenings and databanks 
not only violate the public's rights but also serve as "a movement of 
the onus of proof onto the public itself. People are to feel guilty until 
proved innocent. "355 In addition, the NSW Privacy Commissioner wor-
ries that the proposed legislation does not have enough safeguards in 
place to prevent misuse and control access.356 The Privacy Commis-
sioner finds it alarming that the NSW Government did not consult 
Privacy NSW during the debate over the databank legislation.357 Fur-
ther, he suggests that the Government is being pressured by the Police 
Commissioner to pass the legislation despite the fact that it lacks 
many of the privacy safeguards present in the Model Forensic Proce-
dures Bill.358 Thus, the Privacy Commissioner has urged the govern-
ment to consider a number of issues before passing any legislation, 
including deciding who will be sampled, who will have access, what 
kind of auditing will be done, and the procedures for expansion.359 
2. New Zealand 
New Zealand first raised the issue of DNA testing in 1978 when 
the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee published a Re-
port on Bodily Examination and Samples as a Means of Identifica-
tion.360 At that time, the recommendation of testing criminal suspects 
was met with heavy resistance.361 During the next several years, the 
controversial report all but disappeared from the public's con-
science.362 In the late 1980s, however, a private bill was introduced 
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that proposed many of the same recommendations.363 Mter remain-
ing dormant for a few years, New Zealand's Minister of Justice an-
nounced government support for DNA testing and a national DNA 
databank.364 
The Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act was passed in 
1995 and went into affect in 1996.365 Under the Act, DNA samples 
from persons convicted of certain offenses, volunteers, and suspects 
are included in a national databank.366 Over 11,000 samples have 
been entered in the databank since its inception, and officials esti-
mate that approximately three hundred samples are added each 
month.367 Starting in 1998 the databank began to search for compari-
sons between the individual samples and unsolved crime scene sam-
ples.368 Currently, approximately thirty percent of the crime scene 
samples match an individual sample present on the database.369 In 
addition, about twenty percent of the unsolved crimes match samples 
from other crimes on the database.37o 
Despite the obvious success of the New Zealand databank, some 
groups still are concerned about the privacy issues implicated. 371 
While the Act was still under consideration, New Zealand's Privacy 
Commissioner expressed concern over some of the legislation's provi-
sions.372 While noting the presence of certain safeguards, the Com-
missioner objected to the inclusion of voluntary samples of innocent 
people.373 He stated in a report regarding the proposed legislation 
that only samples from those convicted of serious offenses should be 
entered into the databank.374 He supported his contention by arguing 
that certain convicted felons pose a greater risk to society as potential 
recidivists, while no similar justification exists for the inclusion of vol-
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untary samples of innocent people.375 Likewise, the Auckland Council 
for Civil Liberties worries that DNA databanking creates a slippery 
slope of state surveillance that infringes the public's privacy rights.376 
The general concern is that as society becomes more accepting of 
DNA sampling, police will continue to expand the DNA databank un-
til it includes a large, if not complete, portion of society. 377 
3. China 
Ever since the 1997 rape and murder of Democratic Progressive 
Party official Peng Wanju, sex crimes have become a central issue for 
the public in China.378 According to an analysis conducted by sociolo-
gists, approximately lO,OOO sexual assaults are reported each year in 
Taiwan.379 In 1995, 624 people were prosecuted for sex crimes but 
only 216 were convicted.380 Sociologists claim that the low conviction 
rate is due to the difficulty of gathering appropriate evidence in such 
cases.381 Given these troubling statistics, China was ripe to pass a law in 
early 1999 that allows the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the 
Interior to establish a DNA databank.382 Under the law, convicted and 
suspected sex offenders would be asked to provide voluntary blood 
samples.383 If they refuse, a prosecutor may force them to provide 
samples via a subpoena.384 The legislation allows the DNA samples to 
be kept for at least ten years.385 In addition, written and photographic 
documentation of the DNA records may be retained until ten years 
after the death ofthe person who provided the sample.386 
A similar proposal in southern China that would allow the forma-
tion of a DNA database, however, has encountered more resistance.387 
Under the proposal, people suspected of committing crimes with a 
jail term of five or more years would be required to submit a non-
375Id. 
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intimate sample.388 The database also would include samples from 
criminals convicted of serious offenses.389 In addition, the draft law 
allows people to volunteer to submit a DNA sample to eliminate 
themselves from suspicion for specific crimes.39o 
Proponents of the law argue that the draft law is too restrictive 
because it would require judicial authorization or consent in order to 
force a sample from a suspect.391 They claim that this will cause a tre-
mendous backlog in the courts.392 On the other side of the debate, 
some argue that inclusion of convicts' samples is unfair to ex-convicts 
who are supposed to have paid their debt to society.393 In addition, 
others argue that the law should not allow for the inclusion of volun-
tary samples.394 They claim that this is a tactic to collect samples from 
society as a whole.395 Although the samples would be voluntary, many 
maintain that this would shift the burden of proof onto the public to 
prove their own innocence.396 In addition, the Privacy Commissioner 
for Personal Data is closely reviewing the proposed legislation to en-
sure that it does not conflict with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordi-
nance.397 
III. ANALYSIS 
In 1998, the Honorable Laurie Robinson addressed the issue of 
international crime at The Twelfth International Congress on Crimi-
nology.398 During the speech, the Department of Justice announced 
the establishment of an International Center within the National In-
stitute of Justice.399 The Center is responsible for stimulating com-
parative research and information sharing among criminal justice re-
search institutes around the world.400 The call for such a division was 
based on the realization that crime no longer can be confronted in 
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isolation.401 During the address, the assistant attorney general indi-
cated that criminals now have the ability to cross international bor-
ders within a few hours.402 Therefore, crime has become a global issue 
and ''what happens in one part of the world impacts all the rest. And 
crime problems and trends are no different. "403 
Thus, the development and potential of an international DNA 
database is not hard to imagine.404 The United Kingdom already 
shares its DNA database information with other participating coun-
tries.405 Countries that still are developing and moditying database 
laws, such as the United States and Australia, have seen tremendous 
expansion of acceptable legislation.406 These countries are quickly re-
sponding to the demand for justice and lower crime rates by allowing 
for the inclusion of samples from more and more classes of people.407 
Some believe that a mandatory general public database is not far 
off. 408 
An International DNA database certainly could provide potential 
benefits.409 In early 2000, a twenty-six year old navy crewman, John 
Eric Armstrong, was implicated in at least sixteen slayings of prosti-
tutes all over the world, including Japan, Korea, and Israe1.410 It is sus-
pected that Armstrong spent his eight years aboard the USS Nimitz 
going from port to port strangling women.411 Armstrong claims that 
he killed or attempted to kill every prostitute with whom he had 
sex.412 An international DNA database definitely could aid law en-
forcement in the investigation of these and other similar sexually re-
lated crimes.413 Other international crimes, however, tend to be white-
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collar crimes and Internet abuse.414 An international DNA database 
would be far less useful to the investigations of these crimes.415 
Thus, before implementing an international database, govern-
ment officials should carefully review the true benefits of such a sys-
tem. Because many international criminal investigations would not be 
aided by such a system, it is not clear that a balancing test between the 
database pros and cons would favor an international system.416 One of 
the biggest concerns that would need to be addressed is the potential 
for tremendous backlog and an unwieldy amount of data.417 Not only 
would a large international database cause traditional backlog prob-
lems, but it would also raise new concerns.418 
The United Kingdom already has encountered problems with its 
large databank.419 The more samples included on the system, the 
more likely it will produce false matches.420 Therefore, as countries 
combine their data, the statistical significance of a match will be wa-
tered down.421 Laboratories would have to begin to test more loci to 
improve the statistical significance.422 In addition, an international 
database will make it more difficult for statisticians to derive the nec-
essary population comparison statistic.423 Therefore, such a database 
eventually could become a hindrance to prosecutors.424 Furthermore, 
the potential for juror mystification will increase and judges likely will 
become less willing to admit evidence of database produced 
matches.425 
Moreover, the development of an international database would 
demand extreme harmonization efforts.426 Currently, local and na-
tional DNA database legislation differs on many points.427 Some laws 
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allow for testing of suspects and arrestees, while others only allow for 
testing of certain convicts.428 In addition, each law has different ac-
cess, use, and privacy provisions.429 Participating countries would have 
to come together to develop a standard for each of these issues.43o 
Given the recent trend towards databank expansion, it is probable 
that many civil libertarian groups would worry that states and coun-
tries with stricter standards would be forced to relax their restrictions 
on an international leve1.431 In addition, an international database 
would be more difficult to monitor for access abuse.432 Thus, without 
specific auditing procedures in place, concerns over samples being 
used for insurance and job discrimination also would arise.433 
Moreover, local and national database legislation differs in the 
way DNA samples are collected and tested. 434 Some samples are col-
lected from saliva while others are collected from blood.435 In addi-
tion, some are tested using the RLPF process, while other samples are 
tested with PCR procedures.436 Moreover, each country tests a differ-
ent number of loci.437 In order for an international databank to be 
effective, samples need to be uniform for both scientific and legal rea-
sons.438 The United States already has had to confront the scientific 
problem caused when samples are inconsistent because they are ana-
lyzed using both RLPF and PCR testing.439 Moreover, officials in 
China and Australia are focusing on the legal issue of how the sample 
is taken.44o A mouth swab sample is considered non-intimate while a 
blood sample is intimate.441 Under certain legislation, intimate sam-
ples require consent or a court order while other samples do not.442 
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Given these serious potential problems, an international DNA 
database may not be the answer that governments and victims' fami-
lies are looking for. Instead, countries should continue to develop 
their own national DNA databank laws to answer these concerns indi-
vidually. Mter carefully reviewing privacy and abuse concerns locally, 
legislatures can provide for international sample sharing on a case-by-
case basis.443 DNA database laws can be drafted to allow law enforce-
ment officials to share samples with other countries in specific in-
stances.444 Because individual governments would draft the laws, it 
would be less likely that some countIies would feel pressured to ex-
pand their legislation to match the provisions of other countries.445 
The laws could explicitly set out what data will be entered and shared 
and how data from other countries would be used. 
In addition, such a system also would prevent the watering down 
of DNA statistical, and therefore legal, significance.446 While a large, 
centralized international databank would cause a backlog and a re-
duction in statistical significance, a system of individual DNA data-
banks sharing data on a case-by-case basis would not have the same 
effect.447 Prosecutors and law enforcement could maintain the statisti-
cal strength of the samples by comparing crime scene data to coun-
tries individually, therefore reducing the sample pool.448 With smaller 
databanks there would also be a lower chance of incorrect matches.449 
In addition, individual databanks would make it much easier for sci-
entists to determine population comparison statistics.45o 
Moreover, a system of individual national databanks would be 
easier to audit for potential access abuse.451 It would be much easier 
for officials to monitor smaller databanks rather than trying to over-
see a massive system.452 In addition, legislatures have to provide for 
some type of criminal sanction for abuse.453 If there is a centralized 
international database, a criminal sanction could create jurisdictional 
problems. With individual databanks, however, each country can de-
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velop its own criminal sanctions without regard to jurisdictional is-
sues. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the horrific stories of young Hope Denise Hall 
and the ninety-three year old Australian rape victim, it is easy and un-
derstandable for the public at large to demand justice at all costs. Just 
as many of the male citizens of Wee Waa, Australia were willing to 
submit DNA samples to help solve a terrible crime, many people 
across the world cannot understand why anyone would want to get in 
the way of improved crime fighting. 
Society must be cautioned, however, in the era of the DNA Revo-
lution. The potential for error, privacy violations, and jury mystifica-
tion become greater each day, and yet, many are quick to assume that 
the only people who have reason for concern are the guilty. Thus, in 
developing an international crime-fighting tool, legislatures need to 
be aware of the potential negative ramifications of a centralized sys-
tem. With such awareness, legislatures could provide the benefits of 
an international database while eliminating some of the costs by fo-
cusing on individual national databank legislation and data sharing. 
Otherwise, the potential for abuse arising out of unwarranted expan-
sion could infringe upon the rights of society as a whole. If that hap-
pens, not only criminals would have a reason for concern. 
